1763 Berbice Slave Revolt Part 3

On the 4th July 1762, the Dutch slave-ship de Eenigheyt slipped over the bar at the entrance to the Berbice River, and taking the deeper eastern channel past Crab Island, dropped anchor in front of Post St. Andries. Among the two hundred and eighty-six slaves packed in her reeking hold was a young man named Atta, who was destined to become one of the great leaders of the 1763 Uprising. Chained near to him was his ship-brother Quabi, who was to follow him loyally to the end of his life. At this point, Atta had less than two years to live, but before he met his death, he and others would rock the Dutch plantation system in the Guianas to its very foundations. Before the Dutch would be able to reassert control over their colony, they would have been forced to mount the most massive military expedition against their former slaves ever seen in that part of the hemisphere. Never again until 1791 would any European nation come so close to losing an entire colony to its slaves.
Part II
The Background to the Uprising
Dutch regulations against revolt
Like the other West Indian colonies, the Dutch passed regulations to try and reduce the likelihood of revolt. The Company had a rule about black:white ratios, for example, which was never really enforced. According to the regulation, a plantation had to have one White for every 15 Blacks. The biggest transgressor of this rule, however, was the Company itself, whose average plantation ratio of 1:26 was well above that of the average private ratio of 1:12, although many private plantations broke the rule too. As it happened, those plantations which led the Uprising in 1763 did not have unusual ratios, while some of the plantations with very high black:white ratios took no part in it.
The Dutch had introduced Pass Laws into Berbice in order to restrict slave movement and make it difficult for slaves on different plantations to conspire together. As in other colonies, a slave was not allowed beyond the boundaries of his plantation without a written pass from his master. Two ordinances on the subject from 1735 and 1738 were completely ignored by everyone, and in 1739, the administration tried a different approach by ordering the chaining-up of corials at weekends. As with the earlier ones, it would appear that this ordinance too was totally disregarded by all and sundry.
In order to ensure that the seeds of revolt were not imported from outside, an ordinance was passed in 1762, prohibiting planters from bringing in slaves from another colony if those slaves had ever been before the courts there.
Ordinance of 1739
On closer reflection regarding the disorders which are caused daily by the frequent roaming of negro slaves on the river, especially on Saturday and Sunday nights, His Excellency the Governor and Councilors have thought fit … to order … both Colony planters and free inhabitants … to ensure that all the boats, namely the small canoes or corials which are on the plantations under their management, and which belong to the plantation or to the slaves are chained up early at the aforementioned period, to wit Saturday and Sunday evening in order thus to prevent the roaming around at night of the aforementioned slaves; and those who might not have a chain are earnestly instructed to obtain one within the period of one year on pain of a fine of 25 guilders …
Van Hoogenheim, 1764
Besides letting them [i.e] the slaves roam around at night is one of the greatest mistakes in the handling of slaves. It has always happened here and I complained about it frequently. Probably it is one of the chief causes of then entire revolution.
Conditions in Berbice unfavourable to revolt
Despite the laxity of the Dutch authorities and planters, the great Uprising of 1763 is, at first impression, a surprising event in terms of West Indian history. Some of the conditions normally associated with revolt simply did not exist in Berbice. The slave population was very mixed, and there was no large concentration of any one linguistic group who could have organized a rebellion. In fact, there was simply no large concentration of population anywhere in Berbice. A handful of plantations in the same parish could easily supply a body of 1,000 men in Jamaica, but in Berbice the manpower of nearly an entire division had to be mustered in order to achieve that total.
From the point of view of revolt, geographical conditions were not really in the slaves' favour either, owing to the ribbon-like lay-out of plantations. Organization and secrecy would have presented major problems in such circumstances. There was also the difficulty of the Amerindians. It would not have been easy to plot a large-scale uprising without the plantation Amerindians, at least, knowing about it. Some plantation Amerindians may well have been sympathetic to the slaves, but this was certainly not something that conspiring slaves could have relied upon. If a small revolt actually got underway, its chances of success were severely limited by the presence of the bush tribes, who normally assisted the Dutch in stamping out maroon communities.
From Head Division upwards, where the river is much narrower, it was also easy for plantations on the opposite side to come to the aid of a beleaguered planter. The river acted as a sounding board, amplifying noises on the other bank, so that unless rebels were very discreet, they attracted attention to themselves long before they had time to spread the revolt to other estates, or make good their escape into the bush.
Earlier revolts
Not surprisingly, therefore, revolts were not all that common in Berbice. Of the few that occurred before 1763, all were very small-scale. The first recorded revolt was in Canje in 1733 or 4, and involved a dozen Company slaves. These had been hired out to employees of the Vernesobre family who were laying out their new plantation of Monbijoux. The slaves were so brutally treated that they finally decided to kill their tormentors and run away. The Indians killed some of them, and brought in the rest from the bush.
In 1749 and 1752, there were two small revolts in Upper Division. These also involved small groups, both of which attempted to set up maroon camps in the bush. Owing to the noise they made, they soon attracted attention to themselves, and their efforts were easily frustrated.
In 1762, another similar incident occurred. On this occasion, however, the Dutch proved very incompetent in dealing with the situation, and the episode had some very far-reaching consequences. The slaves from two plantations in Upper Divison belonging to the same planter ran away and set up a maroon encampment beyond "Savonette. For one reason or another, it took the Dutch nearly two months to wipe out the settlement of only twenty-six people. For one thing, the Amerindians proved very unwilling for once to co-operate with the Dutch in attacking the camp. Van Hoogenheim was extremely angry and complained that "the cowardice of our Indians is indescribable, as they had the ability to overpower such a small number of vagabonds". The accusation of cowardice might have been more aptly applied to the Governor's own burgher-militia, as the Amerindians were very quick to point out. They said that they thought that the Whites had behaved in a cowardly fashion, and had not appeared to want to put themselves out, so they hardly saw why they (the Indians) should do so. They also complained that arrows and bows were of little use against rebels armed with muskets. This last point, at least, was taken to heart by the Dutch, who issued their Amerindian supporters with firearms in the Great Uprising of 1763.
http://www.cwo.com/~lucumi/berbice.html